Exclusive interview with Dan Lipman, President of the Westinghouse Energy Systems business unit
The text by Nina Yavorska, Oleg Kilnytskyi
What is currently happening with the construction of units 5 and 6 of the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant, which are to be the first in Ukraine built using Westinghouse AP1000 technology?
First of all, I would like to say that it means a lot to me to be able to help Ukraine and support this project, because my grandmother is from Ukraine.
As for the project at the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant, it is currently in the active planning phase.
Unfortunately, there has been no construction progress as such, because the war is ongoing and the company is unable to send its employees to Ukraine.
But as soon as the war is over, we will start doing so, and I can assure you that I will be the first Westinghouse representative to come to Ukraine.
So, is the probability that Ukraine will become the first country in Europe to have an AP1000 unit low because of the war? You probably know that our Ministry of Energy previously announced such ambitious plans.
This isn’t the Olympics or a race! As soon as the war is over, we will do everything we can to deliver the power units to Ukraine.
Poland and Bulgaria are also moving quickly, and they don’t face the same challenges that Ukraine faces today. Therefore, their situation is different.
Building new units at the Khmelnytskyi NPP is a very complex task that requires significant preparation. We are currently working with Energoatom to determine what steps are necessary at the beginning of the project so that it can then move forward effectively.
Our work is currently focused on three areas.
First, we are working with Energoatom to provide a simulator for training and qualifying operators, so the company can better understand how to operate the AP1000 reactor and train its personnel. We can do this even when our employees cannot travel to Ukraine.
The second area – which I would call political – involves close cooperation with the US Export-Import Bank on financing Khmelnytskyi NPP units 5 and 6. This will be necessary to start the next phase of the project, namely the engineering phase, which we carry out in all the countries where we operate. This is happening in Poland and Bulgaria, and it will happen in Ukraine as well.
At this engineering stage, we must develop and provide data packages on reactor systems. They are needed for licensing and regulation, and will also be used to determine the project cost and for further cooperation with the Ukrainian nuclear regulator.
The third area is probably the most specific of all. Some time ago, Energoatom signed an agreement to purchase equipment for the AP1000 reactor from a project in the United States that was canceled. This equipment is currently in the company’s possession, and Energoatom is paying for it in installments, in accordance with that agreement. Once the war is over, the company will be ready to provide this equipment.
Thus, by the end of the war, the engineering part will be ready, personnel will be trained, and the equipment will be ready for shipment.
How much will the equipment for each of the Khmelnytskyi NPP units 5 and 6 cost in total, and how much has Energoatom already paid Westinghouse?
As of now, Energoatom has paid one-third of the total for the equipment from the canceled U.S. project I mentioned. The overall estimate for the project has not yet been determined because we do not have access to the site where the facility will be located and do not know the condition of the structures, so we have not yet developed a cost assessment.
First comes the assessment – then an understanding of the total amount.
When the first concrete was poured into the foundation of KhNPP-5, former company president Patrick Fragman said that the agreement between Energoatom and Westinghouse was the “wedding of the year.” He also said that the US government was strongly supporting this project. How is this support manifested now?
As president of the Westinghouse Energy Systems business unit, I communicate and work with representatives of the US government almost every day.
My contacts in the US Administration, the Department of Energy, the Department of Commerce, and the White House are people I speak with frequently.
Each of these contacts is well aware of our cooperation with Ukraine and Energoatom. They have heard about the same plans I just described.
And each of them supports the future export of Westinghouse AP1000 technology to Ukraine – as soon as the war ends.
I would say that everyone understands: when the war ends, Ukraine will need to make significant efforts to rebuild, and energy infrastructure – especially nuclear power – will be a key part of that reconstruction. Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has been significantly damaged as a result of Russia’s illegal invasion and attacks. My contacts fully support our plans to develop nuclear energy in your country.
Let’s imagine that the war is over. How many AP1000 reactors can be built in Ukraine? The memorandum between Energoatom and your company provides for nine.
This is a process that requires a lot of planning. The issue is not so much construction itself as it is planning. Just as a tent needs a pole to hold it up, we need a plan.
This involves the supply chain, equipment, and components – large and small. We need to plan who will deliver all this to Ukraine, how and when, and what will be produced domestically.
Once this plan is developed jointly with Energoatom, it will be clear how many power units can be built simultaneously.
In addition, as citizens of Ukraine, you have other reconstruction priorities beyond nuclear energy.
But I want to emphasize again that the duration of AP1000 construction is determined not by the construction itself, but by the time required to manufacture and deliver equipment.
That is one of the issues I have been working on with Energoatom for over a year: deciding which equipment can and should be produced in Ukraine in parallel with production abroad. This parallel production could accelerate the AP1000 construction process.
It is worth noting that neighboring countries – Poland and others – will also be able to produce or help produce this equipment, including to support Ukraine’s future nuclear program.
In other words, components could be manufactured not only in the United States and Ukraine, but also in Poland and other European countries.
All this could further speed up the construction process.
And now, can we already say what can be produced in Ukraine?
Westinghouse follows a philosophy that goes like this: We buy where we build. We strive to purchase or manufacture a significant portion of the equipment and components in the country where we operate and build our reactors.
In our discussions with Energoatom management, we are indeed considering the production of certain modules in Ukraine.
What are modules? They are sets of equipment assembled from several components – somewhat like Lego. They can be small, like a food processor in your kitchen, or large, like half a room. Modular construction is how airplanes, submarines, and ships are built – and that is how we build AP1000 reactors.
Many of these modules can already be manufactured in Ukraine, even now.
This means that Ukraine could gradually start producing these components. Energoatom has said there are locations in western Ukraine where such components could be manufactured even during the war.
Accordingly, after the war ends, it will be possible to combine the equipment Energoatom purchases from Westinghouse with that produced locally – which will also speed up construction timelines.
As you know, we have encountered delays in purchasing two Soviet-designed VVER-1000 reactors for Khmelnytskyi NPP units 3 and 4 from Bulgaria. Has Westinghouse had any talks with our Ministry of Energy or the government about completing those units using your technology? And is that even possible?
First, any discussions regarding units 3 and 4 of the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant have been put on hold until talks between Ukraine and Bulgaria are concluded.
Second, to be honest, we never considered completing these units using 100% Westinghouse technology.
However, we do have the capability to support VVER-type units with advanced Westinghouse systems that are far more technically sophisticated than those used by the Russians – control tools, monitoring systems, and so on.
These systems are already operating on other VVER-type reactors outside both Russia and Ukraine.
In addition, as you know, Westinghouse supplies nuclear fuel for VVER reactors both in Ukraine and in other countries operating this reactor type.
In fact, in all European countries where such reactors exist – except Hungary. Hungary is probably the only country where Westinghouse does not currently supply its nuclear fuel.
So, am I correct in understanding that a Westinghouse reactor cannot be integrated into structures built for a VVER?
I wouldn’t say it’s impossible – any engineer can find ways to make the impossible possible. But this is a theoretical question. From a practical standpoint, it would not be the most efficient way to build or install the AP1000.
Reactors of this type are best installed at new sites.
It’s simpler, more efficient, and more cost-effective for Ukraine.
So, generally speaking, it is better to install Westinghouse reactors at new sites than to try to fit them into existing structures.
I wouldn’t say it’s entirely impossible, but we haven’t even discussed it, since it’s clear that building new sites is the better approach.
How many AP1000 construction projects is Westinghouse currently implementing worldwide? Which ones are in the active phase?
As of now, two AP1000 power units are operating in the United States, and they are performing very well.
For example, the Vogtle reactor in Georgia recently underwent scheduled maintenance, and before that, it was operating at over 96% capacity – an excellent result.
Four more reactors are already operating in China – that’s six in total. Another 14 are under construction, also in China. And recently, preparations began for additional reactor projects in the United States. As US President Donald Trump noted, this could be around 10 reactors, although the number will likely be closer to 12–14 additional units.
In addition to that, a project for three AP1000 units in the Pomeranian Voivodeship in Poland is in the engineering services and supply chain development phase, with construction expected to start after signing the Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) contract in mid 2026. In Bulgaria, a project for two AP1000 units at Kozloduy is also in the engineering services and supply chain development stage, with the EPC contract slated for signing in 2026.
Tell us about the advantages of AP1000 technology, particularly its ability to balance the power grid.
Rebuilding Ukraine will require a huge amount of energy to return its economy to pre-war levels – including large volumes of electricity. The AP1000 reactor can provide more than 1,200 MW of such power.
Another key factor is reliability. When you choose a technology and install power equipment, you need confidence in it even before operation begins. As I mentioned earlier, AP1000 reactors in the United States operate at 95–96% capacity.
We understand that, unfortunately, there have been accidents in Ukraine in the past when primitive Russian technology was used.
Westinghouse technology is different. The AP1000 reactor incorporates state-of-the-art passive safety systems that can safely shut down the reactor even without operator intervention.
And yes, the AP1000 is quite flexible – it can produce more or less power depending on demand.
For example, in certain US regions, large amounts of renewable energy – wind or solar – are used, and the AP1000 can operate in combination with them.
If renewables suddenly stop generating the necessary electricity, since they are not as reliable as nuclear, our reactor can respond by increasing its power output – or, conversely, reduce it when the sun comes out again or the wind picks up.
This flexibility allows grid operators to balance nuclear energy with other sources of generation.
Since you work with Ukraine, you have studied Energoatom’s financial capacity. How sufficient do you think it is for building the AP1000 without major difficulties or problems? Should any additional financial mechanisms be involved – perhaps selling part of the company’s shares or creating a joint venture with an investor?
That’s a very good question. I can give you my opinion, but please understand that I don’t have complete information about Energoatom’s financial condition or capabilities. I also don’t want to cause any speculation in the Ukrainian market. So this will just be my opinion.
From a technical perspective, Energoatom is an excellent nuclear operator with a long history and a deep understanding of nuclear safety. I am confident that technically, it can implement a large-scale project to build new nuclear reactors.
From a financial perspective, you probably know more than I do. But given that more than 50% of Ukraine’s generation capacity has been destroyed or severely damaged by the war, the demand for capital – and the amount required to rebuild nuclear generation – is quite high.
I also know from conversations with Energoatom that the Ukrainian government decided to lower electricity prices for citizens so they can pay below market rates during this difficult wartime period.
Therefore, as mentioned earlier, there is indeed a significant need for external financing to restore generation and build new development programs. This need is critical.
That is why Westinghouse is working closely with the US Ex-Im Bank and the Development Finance Corporation (DFC). This cooperation aims to make US funding available to support the reconstruction of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.
I am also confident that this initiative will be supported by the European community, usually through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
So, without a doubt, external support and additional financing are essential for rebuilding Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.
How close is the company to commissioning a small modular reactor, and when will they be used operationally? Under what conditions could one be built in Ukraine?
The SMR design and concept provide an important opportunity to place the energy source close to consumption centers.
The idea is that it operates at full capacity, providing all the energy for a specific nearby application – for example, a large data center, community, factory, or industrial zone.
Westinghouse also has an AP300 reactor, which, in terms of engineering and design, is based on the same principles as the AP1000 – but at under 300 MW compared to almost 1,200 MW.
If Ukraine implements the AP1000, it will also be quite straightforward to introduce the AP300 by analogy.
However, in almost all cases, SMRs are not as cost-effective as large reactors. Technically, the company could easily build AP300s after completing the first AP1000, but it’s not the best investment right now, because Ukraine needs large-scale nuclear capacity first.
Small reactors are what we call fast followers. If we make a purely theoretical assumption – this is not a forecast – if an AP1000 were under construction now, it could be ready around 2032–2033, and if an AP300 were started immediately afterward, it could be ready by 2035.
They are built faster, but are less profitable from an investment standpoint. It’s better to build a large one first, and then develop smaller ones on its foundation.
It’s also worth adding that all the reactor projects currently being discussed in Central and Eastern Europe – including in Ukraine – aim to eliminate Russian influence in the nuclear energy sector.
This means that most countries are interested primarily in AP1000 reactors. They are also interested in the AP300, but the priority today is large reactors. The same applies in the US: first large reactors, then small modular ones.
This question is not political, but rather technical. How do you assess the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, which is occupied by the Russian Federation? Will we see it operating again, given its dire condition?
That is indeed a very good question. I was in Vienna together with the Ukrainian Minister of Energy and the Energoatom leadership. We discussed this, and the reality is that no one has 100% reliable information about the condition of this nuclear power plant.
I know that the International Atomic Energy Agency has raised questions about the safety of its continued operation due to the severe damage caused by the Russians on the site.
I don’t have any unique technical insights, so before determining whether the Zaporizhzhia NPP can continue operating, a detailed technical assessment will be required.
But that is precisely why I believe we must move quickly to install new generation capacity in Ukraine, including AP1000 reactors. Because of the lack of information, we must assume – at least in our planning – that the ZNPP cannot be used. Accordingly, the capacity it provided will need to be replaced.