Opinion: Russia Tests NATO’s Appetite for War

Political scientist Andreas Umland answers questions from the German daily newspaper Der Tagesspiegel and Kyiv Post to assess the implications of Russia’s most recent provocations – incursions into NATO airspace.

The ISW sees Russia in ‘Phase 0’ of a possible war with NATO. According to this, Russia is currently creating the material and psychological conditions for a war. Do you also believe that Russia’s recent actions can be interpreted as a preparatory phase for a war on NATO?

From a rational foreign policy perspective, this would be out of the question, as the forces are too unequal. However, irrational impulses and domestic political calculations could drive the Russian leadership to further confrontation, as many recent indications suggest.

Since 2014, military and expansionist successes have increasingly become core elements, if not anchors of stability, of Putin’s rule. In particular, in the event of a victory over Ukraine or a ceasefire with permanent territorial gains for Russia, there will be a temptation to direct Russian society, which is already highly militarized, towards a new goal.

Are the drone flights, for example, an indication of this?

These new provocations have a lot to do with the political changes in the US in 2025. With America’s support for Europe no longer 100% and Washington’s policy on Russia confused, European fears of escalation and Russian appetite for escalation are growing.

Airspace violations are now an effective means for Moscow to stir up uncertainty and disagreement in NATO countries.

The Kremlin also apparently wants to divert Western attention and resources away from Ukraine.

What do you think will follow ‘Phase 0’? An attack already?

At the very least, Russia is giving the impression that an attack is possible. Moscow presumably wants to keep open the option of taking action against NATO countries using hybrid military and, if necessary, conventional kinetic means.

However, as long as the war in Ukraine continues and Russia does not win it, at least in part, in one form or another, an attack on a NATO country seems unlikely. That is because it would mean Russia would have to fight a war on two fronts.

If, on the other hand, Russia achieves some kind of victory in Ukraine, the risk of escalation in the Baltic states, for example, will increase. Intoxicated by success and highly mobilized militarily, the Kremlin could succumb to the temptation to test NATO’s resolve on the Estonian and/or Lithuanian border. Only a visible Russian defeat in Ukraine, combined with an internal socio-economic crisis, will dampen Moscow’s expansionist ambitions in the long term.

It would seem Russia is currently waging psychological warfare against NATO countries. What, in your view, is their aim and what is the likelihood of their success?

The main – though not only – driver and context of this psychological warfare is Moscow’s lacking success in the Russo-Ukrainian War as well as the war’s increasingly problematic economic, social and political repercussions inside Russia. As there is little movement on the front and no defeatism in the rear of Ukraine, Russia is experimenting with other methods to deter, frighten, demobilize or, in other ways, complicate Western support for Ukraine.

In some ways, this follows the old Soviet approach of “escalating to de-escalate.” Moscow increases the stakes of the war and hopes that this will confuse, divide and restrain the Coalition of the Willing.

Another motivation is to check how far NATO is still functioning under the new US administration. So far, the West has not passed this examination as NATO’s response to the Russian provocations remains muted.