Opinion: What Should We Make of the Coalition of the Willing Security Guarantees?

On Jan. 6, leaders from nearly 35 nations convened in Paris to formalize the direction for the “Coalition of the Willing,” the multinational group created to prevent renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine after the war ends. This meeting came following a flurry of political level negotiations aimed at producing an actionable roadmap for achieving a cessation of hostilities. Those negotiations included a framework for peace, postwar recovery plans, and, the subject of the Paris meetings, security guarantees.

With the high level participation in Paris, there was no doubt whether there is sustained international attention on support for Ukraine; rather, the question was whether the outcomes of the meetings were actually substantive. The short answer is yes, but the highly touted outcomes are still just milestones with a more difficult path for implementation that awaits.

Deliverables from Paris

There were two key deliverables from the Paris meeting: the first was a joint declaration from the Coalition of the Willing members which stated their intent to implement postwar security guarantees and identified specific means for doing so. One of which is participation in a proposed US-led ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism.

In other words, the United States will establish some form of commission or organization that is responsible for overseeing the implementation of any peace-related agreements concluded between the warring parties. This would not be a new role for the United States, as it has led the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission in Korea since the signing of the 1953 Armistice Agreement. Presumably, the Coalition of the Willing members will provide personnel and resources to augment this US-led effort in postwar Ukraine.

They also declared their intent to establish a “Multinational Force for Ukraine.” While the declaration specifically mentions support to rebuilding Ukraine’s armed forces and to establishing a credible deterrent, fundamentally, the purpose of a multinational force like this is threefold: deter armed aggression; mitigate overreaction to incidents; and support implementation of peace-related agreements.

Further, the Coalition of the Willing members committed to other actions that would strengthen their long-term support to Ukrainian security. This includes continuing critical military assistance, creating binding legal commitments to support Ukraine in the event of a future armed attack by Russia, and deepening defense cooperation with Ukraine in the areas of training, defense industrial joint production, and intelligence cooperation. They also announced the intent to establish a US-Ukraine-Coalition coordination cell at the coalition’s operational headquarters in Paris.

The second key deliverable at the Paris meeting was a trilateral declaration between Ukraine, France, and the United Kingdom. With this, the UK and French documented their intent to deploy forces to Ukraine following the cessation of wartime hostilities. They also expressed their plan to establish military hubs in the country to support implementation of postwar security guarantees.

Excellent in principle, difficult in implementation

On paper, this represents considerable progress in establishing meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine. These declarations provide for forces on the ground in Ukraine, establishment of binding defense commitments, and the creation of a monitoring and verification mechanism. Each of these are essential components to a durable peace process, particularly given Russia’s record for breaching deals.

In fact, if these declarations function as advertised, they are actually more effective than a NATO “Article 5” defense commitment. This would immediately institutionalize multinational military roles in the peace process, whereas the NATO alliance would still require an accession process that is necessarily focused on collective defense across 30 members rather than Ukraine-specific requirements. Further, these commitments aim to guarantee automatic responses to renewed Russian armed aggression, whereas invoking Article 5 to trigger defense commitments through NATO requires a 30-member consensus. All it would take is a single veto player among the NATO members to disrupt any swift responses to potential Russian aggression against Ukraine.

There are three fundamental problems though. First and foremost: Russia will understand the utility of these security guarantees and will do whatever it takes to de-fang the Coalition of the Willing. Russia has clung to its maximalist demands, which include immediate points of contention with the Paris Declaration and trilateral declaration. In particular, the Kremlin has specifically called for termination of foreign military aid; prohibition of foreign military presence and operations on Ukrainian soil; and the establishment of a bilateral rather than third-party monitoring commission.

Even though the coalition agrees on the way ahead, Russian negotiators will invariably push back on these issues. They will do so because it is in their interest to prevent effective postwar monitoring and deterrence mechanisms, but the Kremlin will also push back because there are no repercussions associated with their objections. Without costs, they can reject the proposal to see whether the Donald Trump administrations softens its commitments and demands additional concessions from Ukraine and other partners.

The second problem is that these declarations are only expressions of intent. They are not binding international instruments, so it would not be difficult for any members of the Coalition of the Willing to back out of these commitments if there was too much pressure, whether from domestic considerations or external influences. Additional agreements will need to be negotiated and concluded to institutionalize these declarations.

Finally, going from paper to implementation will be hard, with political and practical challenges. There is the daunting requirement of managing domestic politics and legislative processes to enable fulfillment of these commitments. Further, to carry out all the pledges in the declarations, the core coalition members must undertake fundamental reallocation of resources. This includes military personnel, equipment, and funding, as well as managing the opportunity costs that come from not employing these things elsewhere. For the Coalition of the Willing members, there will be gaps in implementation of either their broader security strategies or in commitments to Ukraine; they simply do not have enough resources to do both to their full extent.

Way ahead

From here, there is still much work to do. US and Ukrainian negotiators must still resolve the final outstanding issues related to their 20-point peace proposal. Once that is complete, they must engage Russian counterparts to compel concessions that the Kremlin has been reluctant to deliver throughout this whole peace process.

All the while, the Coalition of the Willing members must continue their efforts. This includes taking the domestic actions needed for actualizing their commitments, as well as making necessary adjustments based on any outcomes from the Kremlin negotiations.

The deliverables from the Paris meetings sketch a credible architecture for postwar deterrence and durable peace implementation in Ukraine, but their success is not at all guaranteed. That success will hinge on whether political will can be converted into binding commitments and sustained resourcing in the face of Russian recalcitrance and domestic constraints.

The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.