Neutral in Name Only: How Russia’s Winter Athletes Carry the War to Olympics

As the vetting of Russian athletes for potential participation at the 2026 Winter Olympics moves from principle to practice under guidelines set by the International Olympic Committee (IOC), scrutiny is increasingly extending across a broad range of winter disciplines.

A detailed analysis by the Ukrainian-based Molfar Intelligence Institute, produced with support from the Artycoders team, suggests that questions surrounding neutrality are not confined to a handful of high-profile athletes.

Instead, the report identifies recurring patterns across multiple sports, linking prospective Olympic competitors to pro-war narratives, state-backed institutions, or family networks embedded in Russia’s security and propaganda structures.

This article continues an examination of the findings, focusing on additional disciplines highlighted in the report and the broader implications for how neutrality is defined, assessed and enforced ahead of Milan-Cortina 2026.

Bobsled: a concentration of overt pro-war signals

Among the winter sports examined by Molfar, bobsledding stands out for the sheer scale of documented pro-war or pro-regime behavior. Of the 56 Russian winter athletes identified in the report, 26 compete in bobsledding, making it the single most represented discipline on the list.

Several athletes – Kirill Golubev, Vera Serysheva, Maksim Zhestyankin and Anna Glazkova – were found to have liked or interacted with images of former Russian bobsledder Vladislav Zharovtsev posing in military uniform in early 2025, a gesture researchers interpret as symbolic endorsement of Russia’s armed forces.

Institutional and family links

Golubev’s case shows the overlap between elite sport and state-backed structures. In 2023, he attended the “Territory of Meanings” forum, alongside representatives of Dvizhenie Pervykh, a youth movement co-founded with the militarized organization Yunarmia, which has staged paramilitary activities, including in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories.

Golubev’s father, Sergey Golubev, vice president of the Russian Bobsleigh Federation, has himself posted explicitly pro-war content. In March 2022, days after the invasion began, he shared a video invoking World War II imagery with the slogan: “Our cause is right, the enemy will be defeated, victory will be ours.

Family ties also feature in the cases of Vera Serysheva, whose close relatives’ social media profiles include images in military uniform and photographs of Russian soldiers posing on a Ukrainian flag.

State-affiliated structures and rhetoric

Other athletes show formal or professional connections to institutions supporting Russia’s war effort.

Elena Mamedova was active in TG groups assisting the Russian military in late 2022 and was registered in occupied Crimea prior to the invasion. In a 2023 interview, she said that when Russian athletes return to international competition, they would do so “with anger” to prove they are “still stronger and the best.”

Anna Glazkova combines symbolic and economic links: she has appeared wearing clothing with Russian state symbols, graduated from a university that publicly promotes military contracts, and, according to investigative outlet The Insider, received income from a Gazprom subsidiary in 2023.

The most explicit case cited is Daniil Kuleshov, whose online activity includes messages directed at Ukrainian skeletonist Vladyslav Heraskevych in March 2022, wishing for a shell to hit his home.

Short track: nationalist rhetoric and symbolic alignment

In short track speed skating, Molfar’s analysis highlights explicit nationalist messaging and symbolic rejection of neutrality, particularly in the case of Illarion Saboldashev.

Saboldashev’s public communications repeatedly frame his sporting career in national, rather than neutral, terms. In TG posts, he wrote that even without an Olympic medal he would return “with a good mood and a couple of shouts of ‘Russia, forward!’” language that positions him as a representative of the Russian state rather than an independent athlete.

In January 2025, he published images featuring the Russian flag and has regularly appeared wearing clothing bearing the coat of arms of the Russian Federation. Earlier posts also contain references suggesting familiarity with military service or training, including remarks comparing experiences to being “back in the army.”

Molfar also flagged Saboldashev’s online identifiers. In 2024, his TG handle referenced the term “goida,” which gained prominence after 2022 as a rallying cry at pro-Kremlin events celebrating Russia’s annexation of occupied Ukrainian regions.

Researchers note the term’s association with militarized nationalism and, in certain contexts, extremist subcultures.

Another short track athlete cited in the report, Ivan Posashkov, maintains subscriptions to VK groups that glorify the Soviet past and openly praise the current Russian leadership. Among them are communities whose descriptions explicitly state “Putin approves,” as well as pages disseminating favorable coverage of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Posashkov also follows the account of a former Russian hockey player who fought in the war and was seriously wounded, a figure frequently highlighted in Russian state-linked wartime narratives.

Skeleton: deep institutional ties to Russia’s security apparatus

In skeleton racing, the analysis identifies particularly strong and formalized links to Russia’s military and security institutions, most notably in the case of Olympic champion Aleksandr Tretiakov.

Tretiakov maintains extensive engagement with pro-war and state-controlled information channels. On VK, he follows multiple communities and outlets closely associated with Russia’s military and propaganda ecosystem, including the Russian Defense Ministry, the Zvezda military television channel, RIA Novosti, Kalashnikov-linked media, and accounts promoting militarist narratives around Russia’s war.

Among the figures he follows is Vladlen Tatarsky, a prominent pro-war blogger later killed in a 2023 bombing in St. Petersburg.

Tretiakov is also formally affiliated with CSKA, which operates under Russia’s Ministry of Defense. According to his profile, he has been awarded the Order “For Services to the Fatherland” (2nd degree), a state honor.

In an interview in April 2025, Tretiakov acknowledged that his CSKA membership could complicate his potential admission to the 2026 Winter Olympics under a neutral status. During the early phase of the full-scale invasion in 2022, Russian media explicitly described him as an “army athlete.”

Public messaging within his family further reinforces this alignment. In May 2022, his wife published images of their child dressed in military uniform, accompanied by comments endorsing future military service.

Another skeleton athlete cited in the report, Alina Tararychenkova, illustrates institutional links of a different kind. While she has expressed skepticism about Russians being admitted to the 2026 Olympics and publicly rejected the idea of changing sporting citizenship.

Her family background further situates her within Russia’s state structures. Tararychenkova’s mother holds a senior position in the Oryol city – 350km south of Moscow – administration overseeing youth policy and relations with civic organizations.

Official channels linked to her department have reposted statements explicitly praising Russia’s “special military operation” and framing the war as a defense of history, faith and sovereignty. In late 2024, she was also appointed deputy head of a newly established council created by presidential decree to promote “traditional spiritual and moral values” and historical memory.

When neutrality risks becoming a fiction

The Molfar report does not argue for banning Russian athletes solely on the basis of nationality. Instead, it questions whether the current vetting process for neutral status is robust enough to exclude individuals who, through words, actions or affiliations, have actively supported a war of aggression.

Taken together, the cases examined suggest that elite sport in Russia remains deeply entangled with state institutions, militarized symbolism and expectations of political loyalty – even in the absence of formal national representation.

The report warns that neutrality, as currently applied, risks becoming a procedural label rather than a substantive standard, one that fails to account for public conduct, institutional ties and symbolic alignment.

As eligibility decisions for Milan-Cortina 2026 draw closer, international federations face a narrowing choice: treat neutrality as a legal formality, or enforce it as a meaningful standard requiring demonstrable distance from a war being fought just beyond the Olympic spotlight.

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